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PERSONS
Katherine Shaw Spaht*
JOINT CUSTODY**
Anticipation of the first appellate court decision interpreting Loui-
siana's joint-custody statute need no longer occupy the minds of interested
members of the profession. In Plemer v. Plemer' the Louisiana Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeal reviewed a court-imposed joint custody plan. The
father had filed a rule seeking modification of a prior judgment award-
ing sole custody of the child to the mother. Requesting joint custody of
the child, the father had submitted a proposed plan of implementation.2
Copyright 1983, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Professpr of Law, Louisiana State University.
** A partial list of publications concerning joint custody includes: J. WALLERSTEIN &
J. KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAK-UP: How CHILDREN AND PARENTS COPE WITH DIVORCE
(1980); Abarbanel, Shared Parenting After Separation and Divorce: A Study of Joint Custody,
49 Am. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 320 (1979); Folberg & Graham, Joint Custody of Children
Following Divorce, 12 U.C.D. L. REV. 523 (1979); Foster & Freed, Joint Custody: A Viable
Alternative?, 15 TRIAL 26 (May, 1979); Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 16
FAm. L.Q. 289 (1983); Gaddis, Joint Custody of Children: A Divorce Decision-Making Alter-
native, 16 CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 17 (1978); Green, Joint Custody: California's Presump-
tive Panacea, 12 U. WEST L.A. REV. 67 (1980); Lemon, Joint Custody as a Statutory
Presumption: California's New Civil Code Sections 4600 and 4600.5, 11 GOLDEN GATE U.L.
REV. 485 (1981); Miller, Can Joint Custody Serve the Best Interests of the Child?, 9 BULL.
Am. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 210 (1981); Ramey, Stender & Smaller, Joint Custody: Are
Two Homes Better than One?, 8 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 559 (1979) (includes discussion
of the Joint Custody Study Project, a comprehensive study of joint custody in the initial
stages in San Francisco, California); Comment, The New Joint Custody Statute: Chrysalis
of Conflict or Conciliation?, 21 SANTA CLAL4 L. REV. 471 (1981); Note, Joint Custody
A wards: Toward the Development of Judicial Standards, 48 FORDHAm L. RE, 105 (1979).
Two articles that analyze Louisiana's joint custody statutes appear in the previous volume
of the Louisiana Law Review: Comment, Joint Custody in Louisiana, 43 LA. L. REV. 85
(1982); Note, Louisiana's New Joint Custody Law, 43 LA. L. REV. 759 (1983).
Two additional articles are recommended because in one, experience as a judge apply-
ing California's joint custody statute is related; Mills & Belzer, Joint Custody As a Parent-
ing Alternative, 9 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 853 (1982). In the other, a critical evaluation of
joint custody statutes is conducted. Schulman & Pitt, Second Thoughts on Joint Child
Custody: Analysis of Legislation and Its Implications for Women and Children, 12 GOLDEN
GATE U.L. REV. 538 (1982).
Examples of joint custody plans can be found in 1 A. LINDEY, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS
AND ANTE-NUPTIAL CONTRACTS § 14, forms 14.10-.13 (rev. ed. 1982); M. MORGENBESSER
& N. NEHLS, JOINT CUSTODY (1981).
1. 436 So. 2d 1348 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983).
2. Id. "In his proposed plan Mr. Plemer agreed that Mrs. Hughes should retain physical
custody of Michele during the school year, but he sought physical custody during three
weekends a month, half of the summer vacation, and on alternate holidays." Id. at 1349.
Under Louisiana Civil Code article 146 which became effective January 1, 1983, a parent
acting individually could submit a custody implementation plan to the court prior to is-
suance of a joint custody decree. Unless otherwise indicated, the Civil Code articles cited
refer to the articles in effect prior to September 1, 1983.
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In response to the request for joint custody, the mother opposed any
custody change "on the grounds that shared custody would be confusing
to Michele and disruptive to everyone's lives." 3 Furthermore, she refused
to file a joint custody plan.
After a hearing, the trial judge imposed "a comprehensive and to-
tally structured plan." 4 The judge's plan differed in some important
respects from that submitted by the father, and on appeal additional
modifications of the plan were made. Two aspects of the appellate deci-
sion are significant: (1) its interpretation of the joint custody legislation,
and (2) its reflection of the extent to which the court will impose and
modify a detailed plan of implementation.
In interpreting Louisiana Civil Code article 146, which became effec-
tive January 1, 1983, the court opined that joint custody required a
physical sharing of the child but not "a fifty-fifty sharing of time." ' Each
case, according to the Plemer court, will be decided based upon "the
child's age, the parents' availability and desires, and other factors." 6 In
Plemer, the court noted that "[t]he weekly schedule (over one year) places
Michele with her mother approximately two-thirds of the time."' Such
a physical sharing under the court's plan was reasonable, "[c]onsidering
the child's age and the sole custody enjoyed by Mrs. Hughes in the past. '
Clarification of the sharing of physical custody was necessary in the
Plemer case because the language of article 1469 did not specify what
was required to constitute a sharing of physical care and control under
a joint custody decree. As has been suggested," the statutory language
permitted the possibility of a single residence. The 1983 legislative
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1350.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Article 146(A)(1) & (D) provides in part:
(1) To both parents jointly. The court, shall, unless waived by the court for
good cause shown, require the parents to submit a plan for implementation of
the custody order, or the parents acting individually or in concert may submit
a custody implementation plan to the court prior to issuance of a custody decree.
Such plan may include such considerations as the following:
(a) Domiciliary arrangements for the child or children.
D. For purposes of this Article, "joint custody" shall mean the parents shall
share the physical custody of children of the marriage, subject to any plan of
implementation effected pursuant to Paragraph A of this Article, and shall enjoy
the natural cotutorship of such children in accordance with Article 250. Physical
care and custody shall be shared by the parents in such a way as to assure a
child of frequent and continuing contact with both parents.
10. Note, Louisiana's New Joint Custody Law, 43 LA. L. REV. 759, 766-67 (1983).
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amendments" to article 146 further elucidate the meaning of physical shar-
ing in a joint custody decree: (1) the parents shall "to the extent feas-
ible" share the physical custody of children of the marriage; (2) in mak-
ing an award of physical custody, the court shall consider a list of fac-
tors including the "distance between the respective residences of the
parties";' 2 and (3) a plan of implementation shall allocate time periods
during which each parent shall enjoy physical custody of the children.' 3
The court-imposed plan in Plemer provided that the mother would
have physical custody for approximately nine months during the school
year, and the father would have physical custody all weekends but one
per month. During vacation periods, the father assumed physical custody
but would share all weekends but one per month with the mother. Holidays
were alternated each year. However, one modification of the imposed plan
by the fourth circuit was the allocation of Christmas vacation:
However, allocation of the entire Christmas vacation to one parent
is unrealistic because it totally deprives one parent of visitation
during the two-week Christmas time. Even though we feel the
parents would have worked out their own arrangement to share
Christmas, out of caution we amend the judgment to provide that
the non-custodial parent shall have visitation on December 25 from
2:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m., subject to any mutually agreeable
modifications. '4
Such a modification of a plan imposed in a joint custody decree reflects
the appellate court's willingness to scrutinize and modify a detailed plan.
Another interesting feature of the court-imposed plan relating to
physical joint custody was the provision that "[tihe parent with physical
custody is liable for the child's conduct."'" Civil Code article 250"6 ac-
11. LA. CIv. CODE art. 146, as amended by 1983 La. Acts, No. 695, § I [hereinafter
cited as Act 695]; see infra text accompanying notes 59-70.
12. LA. CIV. CODE art. 146(C)(2)(k), added by Act 695; see Miller, Joint Custody,
13 FAM. L.Q. 345, 373-74 (1979).
13. LA. Civ. CODE art. 146(D), as amended by Act 695; see Miller, supra note 12, at 390.
14. 436 So. 2d at 1350; cf., Miller, supra note 12, at 390-91.
15. 436 So. 2d at 1350.
16. Article 250 provides in part:
Upon divorce or judicial separation from bed and board of parents, the tutorship
of each minor child belongs of right to the parent under whose care he or she
has been placed or to whose care he or she has been entrusted; however, if the
parents are awarded joint custody of a minor child, then the cotutorship of the
minor child shall belong to both parents with equal authority, privileges, and respon-
sibilities, unless modified by order of the court or by an agreement of the parents
approved by the court awarding joint custody.
Note that article 146(D) defines joint custody to mean that the parents enjoy the natural
cotutorship of such children "in accordance with Article 250." However, there is no occa-
sion for tutorship coincidental with an award of pendente lite custody under article 146.
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cords to parents awarded joint custody as in Plemer equal authority,
privileges, and responsibilities "unless modified by order of the court or
by an agreement of the parents approved by the court awarding joint
custody."" In Plemer, the specific modification was by order of the court.
The modification presumably would not affect the right of the victim
damaged by the conduct of the minor to hold each parent responsible 8
for the whole of the claim.' 9 Yet the modification is applicable between
the parties and should be interpreted as permitting indemnification"° from
the parent who had physical custody when the damage was occasioned.'
Ultimately, the provision of the decree stipulating that physical custody
determines liability alters the contribution rights of two persons vicar-
iously liable to a victim. 3
In Audubon Insurance Co. v. Fuller," plaintiff appealed a summary
judgment dismissing his suit against the father of a minor. The trial court
had granted summary judgment, assuming that upon the divorce of the
parents the mother had been awarded custody of the child and thus was
solely responsible to the plaintiff for damage occasioned by the minor
while the child was residing with the father. In reversing the trial court
Civil Code article 246 reads: "The minor not emancipated is placed under the authority
of a tutor after the dissolution of the marriage of his father and mother or the separation
from bed and board of either one of them from the other."
17. LA. CIv. CODE art. 250.
18. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2318: "The father, or after his decease, the mother, are respon-
sible for the damage occasioned by their minor or unemancipated children, residing with
them, or placed by them under the care of other persons, reserving to them recourse against
those persons. The same responsibility attaches to the tutors of minors."
19. Under a joint custody award since both parties enjoy the natural cotutorship of
the minor, each is responsible to the victim for the damage occasioned under the second
paragraph of Civil Code article 2318. Quoted supra note 18. The responsibility is solidary,
LA. Civ. CODE art. 2091, although not the perfect solidarity provided for in Civil Code
article 2093. See, e.g., Foster v. Hampton, 381 So. 2d 789 (1980); Williams v. City of
Baton Rouge, 252 La. 770, 214 So. 2d 138 (1968); Kern v. Travelers Ins. Co., 407 So.
2d 2 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981); see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 2092. But see LA. CODE CiV.
P. 4262; Comment, Joint Custody in Louisiana, 43 LA. L. REv. 85, 113 n.164 (1982).
20. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2106: "If the affair for which the debt has been contracted
in solido, concern only one of the co-obligors in solido, that one is liable for the whole
debt towards the other codebtors, who, with regard to him, are considered only as his
securities." Cf. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2103.
21. The responsibility of the father would be analogous in instances where he is per-
mitted indemnification from the person in whose care he entrusted the minor: "The father,
or after his decease, the mother, are responsible for the damage occasioned by their minor
or unemancipated children, residing with them, or placed by them under the care of the
other persons, reserving to them recourse against those persons." LA. Civ. CODE art. 2318
(emphasis added).
22. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2103.
23. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2318; see supra note 19.
24. 430 So. 2d 343 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983).
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and remanding the case, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal
found that a genuine issue of material fact existed. Under the Oklahoma
judgment of divided custody the evidence was insufficient to establish who
had legal custody at the time of the tortious act. The following language
of the divorce judgment supported the conclusion that divided custody
had been awarded: "That the defendant [father] shall have reasonable
rights of visitation and shall have custody of the children during the defen-
dant's vacation for a period not to exceed three months."25 Although
the parties stipulated that the child was residing with the father at the
time of the act, no evidence established that, under the custody judg-
ment, the act occurred during the father's vacation. If under the decree
the father had legal custody, he alone would be liable to the plaintiff
for damage occasioned by his child. A divided custody decree is
distinguishable from a joint custody decree; under the former only one
parent alternately enjoys the rights and responsibilities of legal custodian
or natural tutor, whereas under the latter both parents simultaneously en-
joy the rights and responsibilities of natural cotutors.26
Joint custody also was defined in Plemer to include both parents "par-
ticipating in decisions affecting the child's life," 27 or joint legal custody.
Article 146(D) imposes an obligation upon parents awarded joint custody
"to exchange information concerning the health, education, and welfare
of the minor child; and, unless allocated, apportioned, or decreed, the
parents or parties shall confer with one another in the exercise of decision-
making rights, responsibilities, and authority." Furthermore, because they
enjoy natural cotutorship, 2" the Code of Civil Procedure requires parents
awarded joint custody to rear and educate the child in accordance with
his station in life29 and to prudently administer his property and repre-
sent him in all civil matters.3" Under both article 146 relative to joint
25. Id. at.344 (quoting March 15, 1972, judgment of the District Court of Cleveland
County, Oklahoma) (emphasis added).
26. Divided custody allows each parent to have the child for a part of the year.
This form of custody may also be referred to as alternating custody. Each parent
has reciprocal visitation rights under this arrangement, and each exercises control
over the child while the child resides in his or her custody.
Folberg & Graham, Joint Custody of Children Following Divorce, 12 U.C.D. L. REV. 523,
526 (1979) (footnote omitted). For a recent Louisiana case in which divided custody was
rejected, see Colley v. Colley, 435 So. 2d 1141 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
In contrast, articles 146 and 250 impose on parents awarded joint custody the rights
and responsibilities of cotutors with the obligations of exchanging vital information concern-
ing the child and of conferring with one another in the exercise of decision-making rights,
responsibilities, and authority.
27. 436 So. 2d at 1350.
28. LA. CIv. CODE art. 250.
29. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 4261.
30. LA. CODE Clv. P. art. 4262.
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custody3' and article 250 relative to cotutorship,32 this equal and joint
responsibility for decision-making may be affected by allocation to one
parent in the decree.
In Plemer, the general decision-making authority was to be shared
by the parents;33 however, the trial judge had allocated to the mother
the authority concerning the child's education during the elementary school
years "but during high school the judgment shifts this authority to the
father." 3 Accepting the wisdom of the allocation to the mother of the
initial responsibility for educational decisions,35 the fourth circuit observed,
"we feel strongly that the trial judge erred by suddenly interrupting this
scheme at the high school level." '3 6 The court then proceeded to modify
the judgment by maintaining ultimate authority in the mother for educa-
tional decisions throughout the child's high school years "with Mr. Plemer
participating as set forth in the court's plan." 37 The court advanced the
following reasons for the modification: "It seems illogical to shift educa-
tional responsibilities after one parent (Mrs. Hughes) would have guided
this aspect of Michele's life for so long. There is no advantage to this
change; in fact, continuity in such a critical area as education is in
Michele's best interest." 38
In addition to responsibility for education, the trial court decree
stipulated that "each parent . . . provide whatever medical treatment is
necessary while the child is in his (her) physical custody." 39 Another pro-
vision of the decree provided that all medical information should be
available to both parents," and all major medical decisions should be
31. LA. CIv. CODE art. 146(D), as amended by Act 695;
Joint custody shall also mean that the parents shall enjoy the natural cotutorship
of such children in accordance with Article 250, subject to the plan of implemen-
tation effected pursuant to Paragraph A of this Article .... An award of joint
custody obligates the parties to exchange information concerning the health, educa-
tion, and welfare of the minor child; and, unless allocated, apportioned, or decreed,
the parents or parties shall confer with one another in the exercise of decision-
making rights, responsibilities, and authority.
32. LA. CIv. CODE art. 250, quoted in part supra note 16.
33. "These parents are to share equally their child, and wherever possible share equally
in the decision-making process regarding this child." Plemer, 436 So. 2d at 1351 (quoting
Plemer. v. Plemer, No. 77-03348, Judgment 4 (La. Orl. Civ. Dist. Ct. Mar. 23, 1983)).
34. Id. at 1350.
35. "Vesting responsibility in Mrs. Hughes during grade school years is plausible because
she has raised the child since birth, arranged her schooling, and shared these experiences
with Michele." Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1351.
38. Id. at 1350-51.
39. Id. at 1351 (quoting Plemer v. Plemer, No. 77-03348, Judgment 4 (La. Orl. Civ.
Dist. Ct. Mar. 23, 1983)).
40. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 146(D), (H). Section H reads: "Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, access to records and information pertaining to a minor child, including
[Vol. 44
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made by both parents. Thus, the decree did not allocate to one parent
the decision-making authority concerning medical problems of the child,
but it allocated to the parent with physical custody the financial respon-
sibility for the joint decision. The fourth circuit modified the decree relative
to medical treatment and expenses. The provision allocating financial
responsibility to one parent for a jointly-made decision was modified "to
have both parents pay equally all major medical expenses (not covered
by insurance) regardless of who has custody if treatment becomes
necessary." ' As to responsibility for medical decisions involving the child,
ultimate authority was allocated to the mother, if the parents disagreed
as to major medical treatment, because "the majority of Michele's custody
has been and will be with her mother.
4 2
The modifications concerning both educational and medical decisions
illustrate the detail incorporated into the court-imposed plan and the ex-
tent to which the reviewing court examined individual provisions. In
Plemer, the appellate court was willing to substitute its judgment for that
of the trial judge in an area of the law in which there is ordinarily con-
siderable deference to the decision of the trial judge.
A plan of implementation under article 146 before the 1983 amend-
ments could include child support, if appropriate. In Plemer, the court-
imposed plan provided for child support of $300 a month for the nine-
month school term. The child support provision represented a $2100 reduc-
tion in the amount awarded the mother in conjunction with the prior
sole custody award. The fourth circuit found no manifest error in the
reduction because the mother's income and the father's custody time had
increased. The fact that the award of child support did not include an
amount for the period of time when the child was residing with the father
raises the question of whether it would ever be appropriate for an award
to include such an amount. The 1983 legislative amendments to article
146 contemplate the possibility of such an award:
If a parent would otherwise be unable to maintain adequate hous-
ing for the child and the other parent has sufficient resources,
the court may order modified support payments for a portion
of housing expenses even during a period when the child is not
residing in the home of the parent receiving support.43
In addition, the amendments to article 146 provide that the court
awarding child support in a joint custody decree "shall consider the im-
pact of any dependency exemption granted to a parent by provisions of
but not limited to medical, dental, and school records, shall not be denied to a parent
because the parent is not the child's custodial parent."
41. 436 So. 2d at 1351.
42. Id.
43. LA. CIv. CODE art. 146(A)(l)(c), as amended by Act 695.
1983]
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any revenue law and shall allocate such exemption to either parent."' 4
The statutory requirement of allocation of the dependency exemption"5
is presumably a response to a journal article discussing the effect of the
joint custody statute on the exemption." Under the Internal Revenue Code,
the general rule is that the cutodial parent is entitled to the exemption
unless the non-custodial parent provides support of $600 during the year
and the decree or written agreement of the parents specifies that he is
entitled to it.' 7 The joint custody statute complicates the issue of who
is the custodial parent, but under Treasury Regulation section 1.152-4(b)
"custody will be deemed 'with the parent who, as between both parents,
has the physical custody of the child for the greater portion of the calen-
dar year.""4 As the judge is now mandated to consider the impact of
the exemption and allocate it in the decree to one parent, the exception
to the general rule ought to be easily established. However, another
exception"9 to the general rule in the Internal Revenue Code supersedes
the exception allowing allocation of the exemption to a parent in the
decree. A non-custodial parent is entitled to the exemption if he provides
more than $1200 a year child support and the custodial parent does not
establish that he has provided a greater amount of support.5 0 Anticipating
that an allocation of the exemption to a parent in a court decree might
not be maintained by the Internal Revenue Service, the 1983 amendment
to article 146(A)(1)(c) continues:
In the event that for any tax year such allocation is not main-
tained by the taxing authorities, then the parent who receives the
benefit of the exemption for such tax year shall not be considered
as having received payment of a thing not due as defined in
Chapter I of Title V of Book III of this Code.5'
Finally, the Plemer decision is significant because it in rather per-
functory fashion discusses the presumption contained in article 146 that
joint custody is in the-best interest of the child.2 At the time of the deci-
44. LA. CIv. CODE art. 146(A)(1)(c), as amended by Act 695; see infra text accompa-
nying note 51 for more of the amendment to article 146(A)(1)(c).
45. I.R.C. § 151(e) (1976).
46. Lehmann, Joint Custody and the Dependancy Exemption, 30 LA. B.J. 346 (1983).
47. I.R.C. § 152(e) (1976).
48. Lehmann, supra note 46, at 349 (quoting Treas. Reg. § 1.152-4(b) (1979)).
49. Treas. Reg. § 1.152-4(d)(3) (1979).
50. I.R.C. § 152(e)(2) (1976).
51. LA. CMy. CODE art. 146(A)(1)(c), as amended by Act 695; see also LA. Civ. CODE
arts. 2301-2313. Article 2301 provides: "He who receives what is not due to him, whether
he receives it through error or knowingly, obliges himself to restore it to him from whom
he has unduly received it."
52. "LSA-C.C. Art. 146, which is made applicable to changes in permanent custody
[Vol. 44
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sion, the two statutory exceptions to the presumption were situations in
which the parents agreed to an award of sole custody or the court found
that joint custody would not be in the best interest of the child." In con-
sidering the second exception to the presumption, which reaffirms its rebut-
table nature, the fourth circuit required "[t]he opposing parent . . . to
show that joint custody is not feasible.""4 The court found that the trial
judge's plan was "reasonable, feasible and in the best interests of
Michele."" Thus, feasibility alone was not the critical factor in determin-
ing that the mother had failed in her burden of rebutting the presump-
tion that joint custody was in Michele's best interest. In fact, the detailed
reasons for judgment contained in the trial judge's opinion specified "the
need for Michele to avoid her mother's dominance and for the child to
'mingle . . .with other people."' 56 Furthermore, the fact that no plan
"could possibly resolve the infinite number of conflicts which can and
will arise between divorced parents in their quest to share their child's
life"'" did not affect the "feasibility" of joint custody."
The awkward phraseology of the second exception to the presump-
tion was amended in 1983 to read: "The presumption in favor of joint
under Art. 157, now creates a rebuttable presumption in favor of joint custody. The oppos-
ing parent has the burden to show that joint custody is not feasible." 436 So. 2d at 1350.
53. LA. CIV. CODE art. 146(C):
There shall be a rebuttable presumption that joint custody is in the best interest
of a minor child unless:
(1) The parents have agreed to an award of custody to one parent or so agree
in open court at a hearing for the purpose of determining the custody of a minor
child of the marriage; or
(2) The court finds that joint custody would not be in the best interest of
the child.
54. 436 So. 2d at 1350.
55. Id. (emphasis added).
56. Id. (quoting Plemer v. Plemer, No. 77-03348, Facts and Reasons for Judgment
3 (La. Orl. Civ. Dist. Ct. Mar. 23, 1983)). The trial judge in giving advice to the parents
stated:
Both parents are to try to see things from the child's point of view, not their
own, and at all times both parents are to act primarily in the child's best interest.
The general attitude of each parent and their communication with their child shall
be: Your parents have their differences, both have gone separate ways, and each
has remarried, each has established a new and different life for themselves.
However, both of your parents love their child, both are interested in her welfare,
and well being; both parents love and want to share their child; both parents
want to be with the child as much as is possible.
Id. at 1351 (quoting Plemer, No. 77-03348, Judgment 4).
57. Id. at 1350.
58. See Note, supra note 10, at 769. "Finally, it will be important to consider the
chance of a dispute arising which could not be settled without an adverse effect on the
child." Id.
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custody may be rebutted by a showing that it is not in the best interest
of the child, after consideration of evidence introduced with respect to
all of the following factors . . . ."I The specific factors to use in
evaluating whether joint custody is in the best interest of the child, as
the statute initially presumes,'6 0 include: emotional ties between the parents
and the child;" the capacity of the parents to give the child love and
guidance and continuation of education and raising of the child in its
religion;6 1 the capacity of parents to provide the child with basic needs;63
the length of time the child has lived in a stable environment and the
desirability of maintaining continuity; 6 the permanence, as a family unit,
of the existing or proposed custodial home;65 the moral fitness of the parents; 66
59. LA. CIV. CODE art. 146(C)(2), as amended by Act 695.
60. LA. CIv. CODE art. 146(C), as amended by Act 695: "There shall be a rebuttable
presumption that joint custody is in the best interest of a minor child."
61. LA. Crv. CODE art. 146(C)(2)(a), added by Act 695: "The love, affection, and other
emotional ties existing between the parties involved and the child." See ALASKA STAT. §
09.55.205(4) (Supp. 1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(3)(b) (West Supp. 1983); IDAHO CODE
§ 32-717(3) (Supp. 1983); ILL, ANN. STAT. ch. 40, 602(3) (Smith-Hurd 1980); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-1610(3)(D) (Supp. 1982); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 403, § 270(l)(c) (Baldwin
1981); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-212(3) (1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04 (Page
Supp. 1982); OR. REv. STAT. § 107.137(1)(a) (1981); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.24(2)(b) (West
1981). See also discussion of factors in awarding visitation rights to a parent of an illegitimate
child in Maxwell v. LeBlanc, 434 So. 2d 375 (La. 1983), and authorities cited therein; cf.
LA. CIv. CODE art. 256, as amended by 1983 La. Acts, No. 215, § 1.
62. LA. CIv. CODE art. 146 (C)(2)(b), added by Act 695: "The capacity and disposition
of the parties involved to give the child love, affection, and guidance and continuation
of the education and raising of the child in its religion or creed, if any." See Maxwell
v. LeBlanc, 434 So. 2d 375 (La. 1983), and authorities cited therein. In the article Family
Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 16 FAM. L.Q. 290, 291-92 (1983) [hereinafter cited
as Family Law] the guidelines for shared custody promulgated by the Maricopa County
Superior Court of Arizona were reproduced and one factor the parents were to consider
in deciding on a shared custody award was arrangements for the children's religious train-
ing, if any. See also In re Burham, 283 N.W.2d 269 (Iowa 1979); News Notes, 6 FAM.
L. REP. 2383 (1980).
63. LA. CIv. CODE art. 146(C)(3)(c), added by Act 695: "The capacity and disposition
of the parties involved to provide the child with food, clothing, medical care, and other
material needs." See ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.205(2) (Supp. 1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(3)(c)
(West Supp. 1983); see also Maxwell v. LeBlanc, 434 So. 2d 375 (La. 1983).
64. LA. CIv. CODE art. 146(C)(2)(d), added by Act 695: "The length of time the child
has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment, and the desirability of maintaining continu-
ity." See ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.205(5) (Supp. 1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(3)(d) (West
Supp. 1983); IDAHO CODE § 32-717(6) (Supp. 1983) (similar); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-212
(1983) (similar); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04(C)(4) (Page Supp. 1982) (similar); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 767.24(2)(c) (West 1981) (similar); see also Maxwell v. LeBlanc, 434 So. 2d
375 (La. 1983).
65. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(3)(e) (West Supp. 1983); IDAHO CODE § 32-717(6)
(Supp. 1983) (similar).
66. LA. CIv. CODE art. 146(C)(2)(f), added by Act 695: "The moral fitness of the par-
ties involved." See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61,13(3)(f) (West Supp. 1983); IDAHo CODE § 32-717(5)
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the mental and physical health of the parties involved; 67 the home, school
and community record of the child;6" the reasonable preference of the
child, if the court deems the child to be of sufficient maturity to express
a preference; 69 the willingness of the parents to facilitate and encourage
a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the
other parent;7" and the distance between the respective residences of the
parents.71 Although it has been suggested that the factors considered in
determining the best interest of the child would probably change because
of the presumption in favor of joint custody,72 the list of factors added
to article 146 by the 1983 amendments include, with some necessary
additions,73 those traditionally applied.
After an examination of the list of factors in article 146, it is at least
arguable that the court in a case like Plemer might conclude that joint
(Supp. 1983); see also Maxwell v. LeBlanc, 434 So. 2d 375 (La. 1983), and authorities cited
therein.
67. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(3)(g) (West Supp. 1983); IDAHO CODE § 32-717(5)
(Supp. 1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, 602(4) (Smith-Hurd 1980); KY. REv. STAT. ANN.
ch. 403, § 270(1)(e) (Baldwin 1981); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-212(5) (1983); OHIO REv.
CODE ANN. § 3109.04(C)(5) (Page Supp. 1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.24(2)(c) (West 1981);
see also Maxwell v. LeBlanc, 434 So. 2d 375 (La. 1983) (court listed as a factor to consider
in awarding visitation privileges, the effect of visitation on the physical condition of the
child).
68. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(3)(h) (West Supp. 1983); IDAHO CODE § 32-717(4)
(Supp. 1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, 602(4) (Smith-Hurd 1980); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
60-1610(3)(E) (Supp. 1982); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 403, § 270(1)(d) (Baldwin 1981); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 40-4-212(4) (1983); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04(C)(4) (Page Supp. 1982);
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 767.24(2)(c) (West 1981).
69. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.205(3) (Supp. 1982) (does not stipulate sufficient in-
telligence); CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(a) (West 1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56(b)
(West 1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(3)(i) (West Supp. 1983); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 571-46(3)
(1976); IDAHO CODE § 32-717(2) (Supp. 1983); Il. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, 602(2) (Smith-Hurd
1980); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41(3)(f) (West Supp. 1983); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(3)(C)
(Supp. 1982); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 403, § 270(l)(b) (Baldwin 1981); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 40-4-212(2) (1983); NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.134(4)(a) (1979); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3109.04 (Page Supp. 1982) (eleven years or older gets choice unless it is unreasonable); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 767.24(2)(a) (West 1981); see also Maxwell v. LeBlanc, 434 So. 2d 375 (La.
1983), and authorities cited therein.
70. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.205(6) (Supp. 1982); CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(b)(1) (West
1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13 (West Supp. 1983); IDAHO CODE § 32-717B(2) (Supp. 1983)
(similar); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41(3)(a)-(h) (West Supp. 1983); LA. Crv. CODE art. 146(A)(2);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-224(2) (1983) (similar); NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.134(3)(a)(2) (1979);
see also Maxwell v. LeBlanc, 434 So. 2d 375 (La., 1983).
71. See Note, supra note 10, at 768-69; see also In re Burham, 283 N.W.2d 269 (Iowa
1979).
72. Note, supra note 10, at 766.
73. For example, the distance between respective residences and the willingness of a
parent to encourage and facilitate a close parent-child relationship between the child and
the other parent were added by the 1983 amendments. See authorities cited supra notes 70-71;
Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 432 A.2d 63 (1981).
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custody is not in the best interests of the child. The outcome will depend
upon the relative weight accorded to such factors as the emotional ties
between the child and her mother,7 ' the permanence as a family unit of
the existing or proposed custodial home7" and the willingness of the parents
to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent-child relation-
ship between the child and the other parent.7"
However, the more fundamental legal question is whether the statute
should contain any presumption as to what is in the best interest of the
child. Absent studies on the long-term effects of joint custody which em-
pirically establish that joint custody is in the best interest of all children,
nothing would appear to justify such a presumption.7 7 Surely, the argu-
ment that the presumption reduces the imbalance between mothers and
fathers in custody suits is not sufficient justification. The alleged justifica-
tion, which elevates parental rights over those of the children, is antithetical
74. "Detailed reasons for judgment emphatically specify the need for Michele to avoid
her mother's dominance and for the child to 'mingle . ..with other people."' Plemer,
436 So. 2d at 1350 (quoting Plemer v. Plemer, No. 77-03348, Facts and Reasons for Judg-
ment 3 (La. Orl. Civ. Dist. Ct. Mar. 23, 1983)).
75. In February, 1981 the former Mrs. Plemer was married to Marshall Hughes,
with whom she and Michele now live. In September of 1981 Mr. Plemer married
Kathleen Pierson, an attorney, who has two daughters, Shannon, age 16 and Elise,
age 10, from her first marriage. Mr. Plemer and his wife reside in her house
with the children.
Id. at 1349.
76. Mrs. Hughes testified that, in early 1983, Michele refused to go to her father's
house unless she would be guaranteed substantial, person-to-person interaction
with her father undiluted by his new family.
• . .Mrs. Hughes contacted Mr. Plemer, told him of Michele's complaints,
and, since he would not agree to spend each visit alone with Michele, she allowed
Michele to forego the weekly visitations .....
... Mrs. Hughes refused to file a [joint custody] plan and opposed any change
on the grounds that shared custody would be confusing to Michele and disruptive
to everyone's lives. At trial, she suggested that Mr. Plemer's visits be curtailed,
i.e., Michele be restricted to daytime visits twice a month and occasional extra
dinner or short outings.
Id. at 1349-50.
77. "Courts should be cautious in awarding joint custody, however, until more long
term custody studies are conducted. Behavioral experts differ in their assessment of which
custody arrangement is best for children. Therefore, there is currently little basis for presump-
tions in custody awards." Comment, The New Joint Custody Statute: Chrysalis of Conflict
or Conciliation?, 21 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 471, 497 (1981) (emphasis added); see also
Schulman & Pitt, Second Thoughts on Joint Child Custody: Analysis of Legislation and
Its Implications for Women and Children, 12 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 538, 552-53 (1982);
Miller, supra note 12, at 403, 408, 411. For a contrary opinion, see Parley, Joint Custody:
A Lawyer's Perspective, 53 CONN. B.J. 310, 313 (1979). Compare California's joint custody
statute which applies the presumption. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600.5 (West 1983). Most experts
agree that joint custody is a desirable arrangement when both parents agree to it and
demonstrate their ability to cooperate in parenting.
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to the purpose of legislation,7" which is to determine custody in the best
interest of the child.
The joint custody presumption, just as its predecessor "the maternal
preference" presumption," contradicts and abrogates the "best interest
of the child" standard. The basis of the best interest standard was a case
by case determination, the court's decision being based on the particular
facts of the case rather than a presumption of what is in the best interest
of all children. A case by case approach is particularly appropriate for
child custody disputes since the relationship of a child to each of its parents
and the relationship of the parents will differ in every case. The statutory
presumption may foretell a trend which departs from a case by case deter-
mination of custody.8" By relying upon the presumption, a court may be
encouraged to award joint custody automatically without determining
whether the parents are prepared to make the arrangement work, and
without inquiring into the objectives of the parties to determine whether
these objectives might be accomplished by alternative arrangements. Fur-
thermore, the presumption may encourage the court to suggest that the
parents negotiate a custody arrangement on the strength of the statutory
presumption and preference, which under certain circumstances may be
ill-advised' and may jeopardize the best interest of the child.8 2
In the final analysis child custody is not simply a legal problem; it
is a human problem and a child development problem that is both in-
terpersonal and psychological. The role the court plays in the custody
issue has a nonlegal effect-it lays the foundation for a post-divorce
78. For example, consider the veto message of Governor Hugh Carey of New York
when for the second consecutive year he vetoed a joint custody statute passed by the
legislature:
Under current New York law, while parents may contract with respect to the
custody of their children they may not bind the court by their agreement where
the best interests of the child requires the court's intervention. I do not believe
we should by statute change this law-to do so could, in my judgment, put the
interests of the separating spouses above the best interests of the child.
Although the bill which is before me this year does not contain an express
presumption in favor of joint custody, its provisions would require that joint
custody be given first consideration.
Family Law, supra note 62, at 294.
79. See, e.g. Estes v. Estes, 261 La. 20, 258 So. 2d 857 (1972); Fulco v. Fulco, 259
La. 1122, 254 So. 2d 603 (1971); Estopinal v. Estopinal, 223 La. 485, 66 So. 2d 311 (1953).
At the meeting of the Family Law Section of the American Bar Association in 1983, Pitts-
burgh practitioner Harry Gusener described the problem as follows: "The greatest evil of
the pro-mother 'tender years presumption,"' he suggested, was that it provided judges with
a way to avoid the agony of decision in a hard case. Now, that is being done with joint
custody as a presumption, he suggested." Ass'n of Trial Lawyers of Am. Conv., 52 U.S.L.W.
2062, 2065 (Aug. 2, 1983); see also Comment, supra note 77, at 494 n.120.
80. See Schulman & Pitt, supra note 77, at 558.
81. Id. at 549-51.
82. Id. at 554-57.
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family. 3 The success of the post-divorce family depends upon the ability
of the members of the family to reorder their lives in such a way that
the welfare of the children is protected. Such enormous power must be
exercised judiciously.
83. Mills & Bezler, Joint Custody as a Parenting Alternative, 9 PEPPERDINE L. REV.
853, 870 (1982).
